On Pleasure
by
Epicurus
We
must consider that of desires some are natural, others vain, and of the natural
some are necessary and others merely natural; and of the necessary some are
necessary for happiness, others for the repose of the body, and others for very
life. The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and
avoidance to the health of the body and (the soul's) freedom from disturbance,
since this is the aim of the life of blessedness. For it is to obtain this end
that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. And when this is once
secured for us, all the tempest of the soul is dispersed, since the living
creature has not to wander as though in search of something that is missing,
and to look for some other thing by which he can fulfill the good of the soul
and the good of the body. For it is then that we have need of pleasure, when we
feel pain owing to the absence of pleasure; (but when we do not feel pain), we
no longer need pleasure. And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and
end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in
us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to
pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge
every good.
And since pleasure is the first good
and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but
sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as
the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures,
since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long
time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not
every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all
are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the
consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all
these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and
conversely the bad as good.
And again independence of desire we
think a great good -- not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but
that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion
that those have the sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it, and that all
that is natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard.
And so plain savors bring us a pleasure equal to a luxurious diet, when all the
pain due to want is removed; and bread and water produce the highest pleasure,
when one who needs them puts them to his lips. To grow accustomed therefore to
simple and not luxurious diet gives us health to the full, and makes a man
alert for the needful employments of life, and when after long intervals we
approach luxuries disposes us better towards them, and fits us to be fearless
of fortune.
When, therefore, we maintain that
pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that
consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree
with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from
trouble in the mind. For it is not
continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the
enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a
pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice
and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest
disturbance of the spirit.
Of all this, the beginning and the
greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even
than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it
teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently
and honorably and justly, (nor again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and
justice) without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with
the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them.